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The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s)
Randal C. Picker*
In a 1927 article on razor-blade counterfeiters, Time magazine
stated the obvious: “as everyone knows, safety razor manufacturers
derive the bulk of their profit, not from razors, but from the
replaceable blades.”1 And this is just as clear today. In his 2009
business best seller, Free, Chris Anderson turns early to the story of
King Gillette’s invention: “By selling cheaply to partners who
would give away the razors, which were useless by themselves, he
was creating demand for disposable blades. … Gillette made its
real profit from the high margin on the blades.”2 Anderson closes
the book with a coda and returns to Gillette: “Just as King
Gillette’s free razors only made sense when paired with expensive
blades, so will today’s Web entrepreneurs have to invent not just
products that people love but also those that they will pay for.” The
razors-and-blades strategy is a simple one: sacrifice returns—
maybe even lose money—on the razor handle but make boatloads
of profits on the blades. Razor handles are useless without blades
and so razor makers had no reason to fear that customers would
take free handles and never appear again.
But there turn out to be two central problems with this story: It
doesn’t seem to work in theory and it doesn’t match the facts very
well. Start with theory. If the razors are actually being sold at a
loss—given away for free—then a better strategy seems clear: let
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the other guy sell the razors at a loss while you sell only the
profitable blades. You don’t have to lose money on the razors if
some other poor sap is willing to do so. Remember the money is in
the blades. That suggests that low-prices for razors only make
sense if customers are loyal or if the razor producer can block other
firms from entering the blade market.
Moreover, giving away free razors doesn’t prevent anyone else
from playing exactly the same strategy, if that turns out to be the
winning one. You can’t lock in anyone with a free razor if someone
else can give them another free razor. Indeed, all of this suggests
just the opposite: if you want to create switching costs through the
razor, the razor needs to have a high price, not a low one. Highpriced razors mean that consumers face substantial switching costs
if the alternative is to buy another high-priced razor. Think of
switching from the Xbox to the PlayStation III. In contrast, users
of free razors face zero switching costs if the alternative is another
free razor. And even a high-priced razor approach to switching
costs works only if everyone is playing that strategy: if another
competitor is willing to give away its razor, then your customers
don’t face substantial switching costs.
And you can’t lock them in through actual blade use, since
once the blades are used, they are gone. The whole premise of
razors-and-blades is that you get them to buy more blades after
they have disposed of the original blades. Razor blades aren’t, to
jump ahead in the story, say ebooks or computer macros, where use
of the product generates a library that has a going forward value
and one that might be forfeited if you switched platforms. You
could lose your library of Kindle books if you choose to switch to a
B&N Nook and your Lotus 1-2-3 macros are worthless if you
want to move to Microsoft Excel. But there is no equivalent razorblade stock that arises from use: once you have used the razor
blades that you have on hand, you can easily switch to the new,
free razor provided by an entrant.
The razors-and-blade strategy doesn’t seem to work very well
unless there is a good way to lock the razor blade—the
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aftermarket—to the razor—the platform. That gets us to the
second problem, the actual facts. For seventeen years—from 1904
to 1921—Gillette could block other firms from the blade market,
or more precisely, the disposable-blades market that Gillette would
create. Gillette’s critical 1904 patents covered razors, thin doubleedged blades and the combination of the two. The time to play
razors-and-blades was during that period, as Gillette knew that it
would get the benefits of its first-stage investment in the underpriced razors by selling high-priced blades at the second stage.
But, unfortunately—at least for the razors-and-blades story—
the best-available evidence suggests just the opposite. Gillette set
an initial price of $5 for the razor with an initial set of blades and
used every available legal means to ensure that its dealers didn’t
undercut that price. $5 was a particularly high price—roughly onethird of the average weekly industrial wage at the time—a
premium product like today’s iPod, except even more expensive.
Gillette maintained a high price throughout the life of the patents
and it was only as the patents were ready to expire that Gillette
switched strategies. And Gillette’s profits did jump after it
switched strategies and started selling more razors and more
blades, suggesting that the expiration of the 1904 patents was
actually good news for Gillette and that there was some truth in
razors-and-blades, even if that had been lost on Gillette itself
during the life of the 1904 patents.
The expiration of the 1904 patents effectively pushed Gillette
into playing a version of razors-and-blades and it did so at a point
when it no longer had a good legal way to lock entrants out of the
compatible blades market, and yet notwithstanding that, Gillette
prospered. We seem to have two razors-and-blades myths. The
first is that Gillette invented razors-and-blades and gave away or
sold low-price handles to sell high-priced blades. Gillette certainly
didn’t do that during the life of the 1904 patents and it only did
something like that when the patents expired and it was forced to
meet the prices of its multi-blade competitors. In some sense, it
was Gillette’s multi-blade competitors who invented razors-and-

Monday, September 13, 2010 1:48 PM

Page 3

Randal C. Picker

The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s)

blades and they did so to separate themselves from the high prices
that Gillette charged for razor handles.
Our second razors-and-blades myth is that you can’t
successfully play razors-and-blades without a way to lock—or tie—
the devices together. Standard economics suggests that a firm
playing razors-and-blades will face entry into the blades business
and that entry will destroy the possibility of subsidizing handles
with expensive blades.3 Even though Gillette did have a new
handle patent in place after the expiration of the 1904 patents, it
didn’t for blades and the expected entry came. And yet
notwithstanding that—somewhat mysteriously from the distance
of today—razors-and-blades seems to have worked even without a
way to lock the blade to the razor.
All of this suggests that the actual story of razors-and-blades is
more complicated and more interesting than the simple story
suggests. This is worth doing on its own, as we should get core
examples right, but also important in that platform two-stage
products like the cell phone, the iPod and iTunes and the Xbox are
pervasive today. The terms of access to those platforms are very
much a live legal issue. Should the law facilitate devices, like digital
rights management, that control access to the platform? Should we
bar exclusive deals for cell-phone handsets? And should we stop
Apple from blocking interoperability with the iPod and iTunes?
We should have a firm grasp on razors-and-blades. For this
paper, four eras are of interest: (1) the pre-Gillette years, ending in
1903; (2) the original Gillette patent years, from 1904 to 1921; (3)
the new Gillette razor (and old Gillette blades), from 1922 to
1929; and (4) the blade format wars and the resulting merger
between Gillette and its chief competitor Auto Strop, 1930 to
1931. Gillette could have played razors-and-blades during the
patent years, but there seems to be little evidence to suggest that it
did so. Gillette of course faced competition from the pre-Gillette
3 Florian Heubrannder, Bernd Skiera & Anja Lambrecht, Time Preferences and the

Pricing
of
Complementary
Durables
and
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444782), July 6, 2010.
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razors and soon faced competition from other multi-blade
entrants. And Gillette’s power to charge a high price for blades was
limited by the willingness of consumers to maintain the blades so
as to extend the useful life of the blades. After all, consumers
shaving at home had always maintained blades before, so the trick
wasn’t in getting them to strop, hone and sharpen but rather in
getting them to stop doing so.
Gillette first introduced razor give-aways after its 1904 patents
expired—the first was with Wrigley gum in 1922—but faced
strong limits on pricing its razor blades. Firms could—and,
unsurprisingly, did—enter the market for Gillette blades after the
1904 patents expired and that entry should have limited the
possible success of playing razors-and-blades. And, with the
introduction of the new patented Gillette razors in 1921, Gillette
continued to charge a high price for its top-of-the-line razor,
suggesting that the low prices and give-aways could easily have
been part of a “freemium” strategy.
But that strategy came to an abrupt halt in 1930, the year in
which, in some fundamental way, Gillette imploded. Auto Strop, a
much smaller competitor led by inventor Henry Gaisman, cleverly
wedded patent and trademark law in an effort to lock-in the blade
aftermarket for its razor handles and introduced a new blade and
blade format that was backwards compatible with the existing
stock of Gillette razors. Gillette responded by introducing a new
razor, a new blade, a new blade format and a new top price of $1.
But, as the new razor blades themselves made painfully clear—
“patents pending”—Gillette had not secured its patent position at
the time of the launch, and Gillette immediately found itself on
the defensive when Auto Strop filed a patent infringement action
alleging that the new razors and blades violated Auto Strop’s
patents. By the end of 1930, Gillette and Auto Strop were to
merge in a shotgun marriage designed to settle the patent
litigation, but the Gillette board of directors—and patent
portfolio—was remade. The Gillette insiders were swept from the
executive committee of the board, and by the end, only one
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razorman was on the executive committee, Henry Gaisman,
formerly of Auto Strop.
I. A New Technology
What did shaving look like as King Gillette set out to revolutionize
it?4 Gillette himself dated the conception of his invention to 1895,5
so turn to the 1895 Montgomery Ward & Co. catalogue to see a
snapshot of the shaving market. Montgomery Ward was the
Amazon of its day, a market leader in the mail-order business.
Local stores, especially outside of big cities, might offer only a
limited selection, but Montgomery Ward promised the world to
the entire country. Catalogue No. 57—Spring and Summer,
1895—was a behemoth, running 624 pages and offering more than
25,000 items for sale.
Razors covered one-and-a-half pages of the catalogue and the
catalogue started with an admonition: “Our razors are fully
warranted by us, and if properly used and stropped on a good smooth
strop they can be returned at our expense and money refunded or
exchanged for another, if not as represented. Many good razors are
rendered useless by stropping them on the edge so as to ‘round’ the
edge. Lay the razor down flat on the strop, and turn on the back.
Never strop a razor by turning with the edge on the strop.” Homeshaving—and remember, many were shaved by professional
barbers—was a high-maintenance undertaking and woe to the
home-shaver who stropped poorly.
Thirty-six different razors were offered. Thirty-five of these
were of the straight razor variety. These differed in the size of the
blade, the material in the protective handle, how the blade was
ground and more. You could get by spending as little as 60 cents
for the Torrey, plain ground 5/8 inch razor or as much as $3.50 for
4 For a detailed look at shaving before the Gillette razor, see Robert K. Waits,
Before Gillette: The Quest for a Safe Razor, Inventors and Patents, 1762-1901 (Lulu
Enterprises, Inc., 2009).
5 King Camp Gillette, Origin of the Gillette Razor, The Gillette Blade, Feb 1918,

p3.
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the Cromwell Criterion razor, German silver lined with a pearl
handle.
One razor stood out from the rest, the Star Safety Razor. The
Star was a so-called “hoe” razor, and while to the modern eye, the
Star looks a little clunky and a
bit intimidating, it is an easilyrecognizable cousin of the razors
that we see today on shelves in
drugstores throughout the world.
Patented in April, 1887, we are
told, the Star was “a great
invention which render[ed]
shaving an easy and convenient
luxury.”
The
catalogue
recognized that the design of the
Star was outside of the norm and
promised that the Star’s blade
could be easily removed and
sharpened “as easily as an
ordinary razor.” The catalogue
offered the Star for $1.50, an
extra blade for $1, a stropping
Yale Literary Magazine, June, 1889
machine for $1.75 and strops
themselves for 40 cents each. Note the implicit price for the Star
handle alone: 50 cents exactly half of the standalone price for the
blade itself.
As all of this suggests, the Star’s design was an outlier. The
Kampfe Brothers, Frederick and Otto, actually obtained their first
U.S. safety-razor patent on June 15, 1880.6 The key invention of
the patent was the hollow metallic blade holder that served as a
lather catcher that captured the shaved whiskers and lather and
prevented soiling of the fingers. The patent contemplated that the
wedge-shaped razor blade would be inserted into an accompanying
6 US Patent No 228,904, issued June 15, 1880 (entitled “Safety Razor”).
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blade holder for honing and stropping. Ads for the Star made clear
that it was to be seen as a new, presumably superior technology.
An ad in the advertising supplement to the June, 1889 Yale
Literary Magazine referenced 13 separate patents in the U.S. and
England and offered, to boot, a testimonial from none other than
Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes.
The 1895 catalogue makes clear that self-shavers faced a
challenge. Almost all of the razors offered were standard straight
razors and poor maintenance of the blade could ruin the razor.
This was both a question of time and skill. You could of course
have someone else do the sharpening—the Ward’s catalogue
offered regrinding services for 35 cents per plain ground razor and
50 cents per hollow ground—but that might mean investing in a
second razor, especially if you had to mail your razor to Ward’s in
Chicago. The Star razor offered a different design but still required
resharpening. And two years later, little had changed. The 1897
Sears, Roebuck catalogue—Cheapest Supply House on Earth—
offered much the same selection. The catalogue made clear that
Sears believed that its razors were good for either “private or
barbers’ use” but otherwise looks familiar: a variety of straight
razors, the Star hoe razor—at the same price offered by Ward’s
two years before—and assorted shaving paraphernalia.
King Gillette thought that he had a better idea and applied for
his patent on December 3, 1901. That application was later
divided and, on November 15, 1904, Gillette was awarded two
patents, nos. 775,134 and 775,135.7 Gillette made clear in the ‘134
patent the difficulties associated with reusable blades:
“My invention is particularly applicable to razors of the
safety type, the use of which as heretofore constructed
involves considerable amount of trouble, time and expense
on the part of the user in keeping the blade sharp, not
only for the reason that the blades used in razors of this
type require to be stropped and honed frequently, which
7 US Patent No 775,134, issued Nov 15, 1904 (entitled “Razor”) and US Patent No
775,135, issued Nov 15, 1904 (entitled “Razor”)
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cannot be done satisfactorily by the average individual user
himself, but also for the reason that the blades are worn
out by honing and having to be replaced at considerable
expense.”8
Reusable blades had to be re-sharpened and individuals didn’t do a
particularly good job of it. They could turn that work over to
professionals but that might mean having two razors.
Gillette had a solution for this. The blade in the Star Safety
razor was a wedge blade and the blade maintained its shape for
cutting through its solid mass. Gillette offered a new approach that
would allow him to eliminate a substantial amount of the mass of
the blade using a novel holder that would make it possible for a
thin blade to remain rigid notwithstanding its loss of mass. Gillette
understood precisely what he was accomplishing:
“so that the blades require but a small amount of material
and can be ground very quickly and easily, and hence I am
able to produce and sell my blades so cheaply that the user
may buy them in quantities and throw them away when
dull without making the expense as incurred as great as
that of keeping the prior blades sharp, and, moreover, will
always have the cutting edge of his razor-blade in the
same perfect condition is that the new blade.”9
Note the tight relationship between the technical invention
and the business-model invention. Before Gillette, blades had
required a certain bulk to maintain their stability so as to make
possible a reliable straight edge for shaving. That bulk necessarily
resulted in a high cost for the blade, as more materials when into
its construction. A high-cost blade meant that the blade was to be
treated as a durable good: It had to be taken care of, perhaps daily
stropping at home to maintain the blade edge for shaving and then
periodic rehoning or sharpening by a professional.

8 No 775,134, p1, lines 8-19.
9 Id at p1, lines 39-49.
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Gillette was able to move blade stability out of the blade and
into the razor itself. Gillette also moved away from forged steel
production to sheet-steel production. Together these changes
created the possibility of a disposable blade.10 Of course, making it
cheaply and selling it cheaply aren’t the same thing. The patent
seemed to contemplate selling cheaply, as would be necessary to
induce self-shavers to change their habits. High prices to
consumers for new blades would still create a strong incentive for
consumers to resharpen the “disposable” blades. Consumers would
trade off the price (and quality) of a new blade against the costs—
in time and money—of resharpening. The latter costs would
impose an upper limit on how much could be charged for
replacement blades, even by a monopoly manufacturer such as
Gillette. And self-shavers already lived in a world in which blade
resharpening was familiar to them.
Indeed, Gillette almost certainly made that easier for them, for
this is little doubt that Gillette dramatically reduced the price of a
second blade. For most straight razors, the only way to get the blade
resharpened was to give up temporary possession of the razor to a
resharpener, though there were a few straight razors with
swappable blades.11 That might be done locally or at a distance if,
for example, the razor was mailed back to Montgomery Ward. For
most straight razors, to have a second blade meant simply to have a
second straight razor. For other razors, including both the Star and
some straight razors, you could buy a separate second blade but the
cost of that blade was significant.
II. A New Business Model
Pricing the razors and the blades presented a standard platform
pricing problem, with a few wrinkles. Try a slightly simplified
version of the facts to understand the possibilities. Suppose that
10 William E. Nickerson, The Development of the Gillette Safety Razor: Part I—
Mr. Gillette’s Invention, The Gillette Blade, May, 1918, p4.
11 Kurt Moe, Interchangeable Blades, The Razor Anthology (Knife World
Publications, 1995).
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the Gillette Razor lasts for six years and one pack of twelve blades
is good for a year of shaves. Gillette contemplates selling the razor
with a pack of blades for $5 and packs of blades for $1 each. Those
were the actual list prices throughout the life of the 1904 patents,
though eventually sellers could discount from those prices and did
so. But start with list, and at list, a prospective Gillette customer
understood that he would pay $10 for shaving equipment for six
years ($5 for the razor and the bundled pack of blades and five
additional packs of blades for $1 each). Now consider two
alternatives: a free razor with blades selling for $1.67 a pack or a
$10 razor bundled with a lifetime of free blades.
In each case, a customer would pay Gillette $10 and would use
six packs of blades, if—a big if, to be sure—actual blade usage
wasn’t influenced by the price of the blades. But, under more
realistic assumptions, the strategies are actually quite different. A
hefty price for the razor itself makes experimentation by customers
expensive. A free razor, with perhaps one blade, lets customers test
out the razor at no risk. As to the blades, if blade purchases were
sensitive to prices, the three strategies are quite different.
Presumably customers would use a very large number of blades if
they were free, so the $10 razor strategy seems particularly
unattractive. But the free razor strategy suffers from a problem as
well, or perhaps two of them. Entrants would naturally target the
blades market, if they could do so consistent with Gillette’s
patents. And, even without entry, shavers might choose to
resharpen expensive blades.
Gillette offered its new razor to the public in the October,
1903 edition of System Magazine. The razor and twenty blades sold
for $5. That was, according to the ad, a supply of two years worth.
Each blade offered two edges and each edge was promised to be
good for twenty to thirty shaves. After that, Gillette offered to
sharpen a used blade for 2½ cents each or to sell new blades for 5
cents each. Of course, that suggests an implicit price for the razor
handle of $4.
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New businesses are constantly experimenting with different
business models, and, at least as
measured against the modern
conception of Gillette’s invention,
the 1903 version of the business
model was quite different. A
potential Gillette customer who
took the ad at face value had to
see three possibilities. After
plunking down his $5, he
wouldn’t see Gillette for two
years. At the point, he could
resharpen the blades on his own
as he had been doing for years;
outsource resharpening to Gillette
for 2½ cents per blade; or buy new
blades—real disposability—at 5
cents a pop.
But Gillette was feeling its
way through the business model.
One month later, in its
November, 1903 ad in System
Magazine, Gillette embraced the
strategy that would be the
centerpiece of its business in the
coming years: “No Stropping, No
Honing.” Product feature or
command? “The user never
sharpens” the Gillette Safety
razor. Gillette had revised the
terms of its offer from one month
before: One razor, twelve doubleedged blades and “a year of
shaving pleasure” all for $5.
Gillette continued to offer to resharpen blades—ten blades for 50
cents—but for the customer, it was “no stropping, no honing.”
Monday, September 13, 2010 1:48 PM
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Gillette sold 51 razors and 14 dozen razor blades in 1903. By
mid-1904, it had settled on the business model and prices that it
would use over the life of the 1904 patents: $5 for a razor, with a
pack of 12 blades, with additional packs of 12 blades for $1.
Looked at from the distance of today, the $5 price is breathtaking.
Take one comparison, namely, the prices of other goods. John
Wanamaker, the Philadelphia department store entrepreneur, had
taken over New York’s A.T. Stewart department store and then
expanded it in 1902. Wanamaker took out a large ad in the August
18, 1904 New York Times.
The men’s serge suit season
was coming to an end and the
remaining suits were priced to
move: $15-$20 suits were
offered for $12. The Fall
“costumes” for women season
was ready to kick off and new
tailored suits started at
$12.50.
In the lower-left hand
space, Wanamaker advertised
the new stropless Gillette
The New York Times, August 18, 1904
safety razor. The pitch was
simple: self-shaving meant stropping and most men weren’t very
good at it. The solution was the disposable blade to be “laid aside
and a new one substituted” once the original blade was no longer
sharp. A new razor, a dozen blades and the right to return that
dozen for six new blades, all for $5. Additional blades were then a
$1 per dozen.
$5 was a big price, a big number compared to other selfshaving tools and quite large compared to other consumer items,
such as men’s and women’s clothing. The Star hoe-style safety
razor sold for $1.45 and if you knew how to resharpen the blade,
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you didn’t need to pay another dime.12 $5 also amounted to
roughly one-third of the average weekly industrial wage in 1900.13
III. Competition
Gillette sold 51 razors and 14 dozen razor blades in 1903. In 1904,
it sold 91,000 razors and 10,000 dozen blades. And in 1905,
277,000 razors and 99,000 dozen blades.14 The two key Gillette
patents were issued in November, 1904 and would run seventeen
years. Before Gillette, razors had been, almost exclusively, singleblade affairs and honing, stropping and resharpening had been
required. Gillette suggested a new, multi-blade approach.
For modern eyes, the 1904 Gillette patents are curiously
narrow, as they are patents on razors and blades but not patents on
business methods. Gillette clearly conceived of the patents as
making possible a new business model, namely substituting
disposable blades for time-consuming stropping, honing and
resharpening. Without the yet-to-be-invented business-method
patent, Gillette could block firms from entering into the market
for Gillette compatible razors and blades but it could not stop
firms from adopting Gillette’s strategy and other firms quickly
followed that path.
Focus on the precise mechanics of this competition. Gillette
certainly had a first-mover advantage in the multi-blade market.
Gillette and the new entrants might compete head-to-head to get
straight-razor shavers to switch to the new technology, but Gillette
customers, at least, presumably weren’t at risk to switch to one of
Gillette’s multi-blade competitors.
Or were they? The pricing strategy for the razors and blades
matters for that competition. Take an extreme example: suppose
that razors were given away for free and producers planned to

12 Montgomery Ward, Fall, 1904 catalogue.
13 George B. Baldwin, The Invention of the Modern Safety Razor: A Case Study of

Industrial Innovation, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Dec 15, 1951, p90 n34.
14 Id at p96.

Monday, September 13, 2010 1:48 PM

Page 14

Randal C. Picker

The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s)

make money on the blades. This, of course, is the classic
characterization of the razors-and-blades strategy. In this hypo, a
Gillette customer would receive a free razor and would buy an
initial pack of blades. Once all of those blades had been used, the
Gillette man could reup by buying another pack of blades. But he
could instead grab a free razor from a Gillette competitor and buy
the corresponding blades from that producer.
Free or low-cost razors don’t create real switching costs for
customers and don’t lock in customers. The strategic problem with
genuinely disposable products is that they are disposable. Once the
blades were gone, they were gone. The razor handle itself wasn’t
disposable but could be made disposable at the right price, such as
if the razor handle were free. Razor blades are quite different from
many of their modern platform counterparts. Video games are
durables. An Xbox customer can’t easily switch over to a new game
system from Sony, even if Sony offered the game box for free.
Switching means forfeiting the installed base of Xbox games. This
isn’t a sunk-cost fallacy: the games are genuine usable assets that
bring a functionality to the Xbox customer and that wouldn’t be
available on the competing platform, at least not without spending
money to buy new games for the new platform. And, of course,
while game platforms are often sold below cost, they aren’t free and
the need to purchase a new platform discourages switching as well.
Gillette routinely advertised its razor handle plus 12 doubleedged blades for $5.00. Additional blades were offered 12 for
$1.00, though Gillette briefly—and profitlessly—flirted with
blades at 10 for 50 cents.15 Indeed, to jump forward in time, a
1913 Sears catalog makes crystal clear how serious Gillette was
about its pricing. That catalog offered five pages on razors and
assorted products “for barbers and private use” though it is clear

15 Russell Adams describes this in his wonderful Gillette biography. See Russell
Adams, King C. Gillette 90 (Little Brown, 1978). Adams also quotes a 1906 company
memo on the role of the blades in Gillette’s business: “The greatest feature of the
business is the almost endless chain of blade consumption, each razor sold paying tribute
to the company as long as the user lives.”
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that some of the offerings were directed primarily to the
professional barbers market. Every item came with a textual
description and a detailed drawing, save one. There was no
drawing of the Gillette Safety Razor. Instead the catalog offered
up an explanation and an apology:
“Gillette Safety Razors are quoted for the accommodation
of some of our customers who want this particular razor.
We don’t claim that this razor will give better satisfaction
than the lower priced safety razors quoted on this page.
This razor is manufactured and sold under a license priced
of $5.00; and we are therefore prevented from offering it
at a price consistent with the prices and values we quote
on other makes and styles of safety razors.”
The razor, a dozen blades and a leather case sold for $5.00 and six
additional blades could be purchased for the price of 45 cents. The
catalog concluded that Sears did “not exchange old blades.”16
But if what Gillette really hoped to invent was disposability, he
certainly didn’t patent it and his company quickly faced entrants in
the
multi-blade
market. The American
Safety
Razor
Company sold the
Ever-Ready brand and
in a 1906 ad offered
the razor and seven
single-edge blades for
$1.00.
Ever-Ready
suggested that the
blades
could
be
stropped like ordinary
McClure's Magazine, 1906
blade and would last
for years. But a new set of blades could be purchased for 75 cents
16 And Adams describes the efforts Gillette took to use the legal system to maintain
the $5 price. See id at p57-58.
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and old blades could be swapped for new blades for 25 cents. It is
hard to know of course whether the blades received back were
actually new blades or just resharpened old blades but even if that
were the case, it would mean that shavers were able to outsource
blade sharpening conveniently and at a modest price. Sears was
offering the Ever-Ready set—razor handle, seven blades and
holder for stropping—for 94 cents, a 6% discount from the price
listed in the Ever-Ready ads. Sears made clear that customers
could maintain the Ever-Ready blades but if that was too complex
an undertaking, Sears stood ready to sell a dozen new replacement
blades for 75 cents.17
The Gem Cutlery Co. had long produced the Gem Razor, a
wedge-blade hoe safety razor similar to the Kampfe Star Safety
Razor. But in 1906, Gem offered the Gem Junior as a direct
competitor to the Gillette approach. The Gem Junior came with a
razor, seven blades—one for each day of the week—and a separate
stropping handle all for $1.00.18 Gem also offered to exchange old
blades for new ones for 25 cents: “Shaving will therefore cost you
next to nothing.”19 The exchange program—“new blades for
old”—figured prominently in Gem Junior ads.20
There were other competitors as well, but as this suggests
briefly, Gillette’s business model—both its actual business model
and its supposed razors-and-blades model—faced real competition
and strong limits. The Ever-Ready and Gem Junior razor handles
were implicitly priced at a very low price. Straight-blade shavers
could try the new multi-blade approach with a minimal upfront
investment and Gillette shavers could switch easily if Gillette blade
prices were too high. If disposability was really valuable, shavers
could get it from Gillette but they could also get it elsewhere and

17 Sears Catalogue No 116, Fall, 1906.
18 American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record, Volume XLVIII, Jan-June,

1906.
19 Appleton’s Magazine, Volume IX, Jan-June, 1907, p802
20 McClure’s Magazine, Volume 29, 1907.
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at a far lower price. And Gillette’s ability to exploit its installed
base of razor handles turned in part on the switching costs its
customers faced. Ever-Ready, Gem and the other multi-blade
competitors made those switching costs very low. Indeed, from
1908 forward, Sears offered one or more multi-blade sets—a
handle with an initial stock of blades—for less than a $1.00 and
did so over the life of the original Gillette patents. Of course, it is
impossible to assess quality from the pages of the Sears catalogues,
but disposability was available at prices substantially below
Gillette’s razor handle price.
The supposed razors-and-blades strategy faced another
important limit: blades that worked in many different handles. In
1913, Sears offered Superior Safety Razor blades for 49 cents a
dozen and those blades fit Superior, Ever-Ready, Star, Gem Junior
and other safety razors. A freestanding wedge blade was also
offered—the Comfort—for a price of 60 cents each. The Comfort
blade was designed for razors such as the Star and the Gem that
used a forged concave blade.21 Ever-Ready and Gem would be
hard pressed to play razors-and-blades with their razor handle
customers if customers could easily buy compatible blades. That in
turn would put more pressure on Gillette so long as Ever-Ready,
Gem and others sold low-priced handles. Gillette was competing
with low-priced handles coupled with a competitive blades
market.22
Gillette maintained an advertised list price of $5.00 for its
standard set—razor handle, a packet of blades and case—during
the life of the 1904 patents. Gillette started high and continued
high during the life of the patents. Of course, list prices are just
that, but the Sears catalogues offer a sense of actual selling prices.
Sears produced two catalogues a year and started selling the
Gillette razor in 1908. Sears sold the Gillette set and separate
21 Sears Catalogue No. 126, Copyright 1913, p959-963.
22 Gillette had even faced direct competition in the Gillette blades market proper

but had successfully asserted its patent against the entrant. See Clark Blade & Razor Co.
rd
v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 194 F 421 (3 Cir 1912).
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packets of blades and from those we can calculate the implicit price
of the handle alone. Sears sold at the list price through the first
half of 1913, where, as you will recall, Sears was apologizing for
being forced to charge list. That changed in the second half of
1913, as the standard $5.00 price was discounted to $3.79 and the
apology had vanished. Whether this was Dr. Miles23 finally
working its way through the system isn’t clear, but even at the
discount, the Gillette was still a premium-priced razor and Gillette
maintained that position until it reached the end of the 1904
patents.
Gillete Prices During the 1904 Patents
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IV. The End of the 1904 Patents: New Patent,
New Business Model
Gillette received his original patents on November 15, 1904, which
meant that, with a 17-year patent term, the patents were due to

23 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 US 373 (1911). Mark

Lemley suggested this possibility at a workshop on the paper and I confess that I had had
the same question.
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expire in November, 1921. Gillette’s decisive advantage conferred
by the patents would then come to an end. Gillette faced two
potential problems: entry into the market for the old Gillette razor
handle and entry into the market for Gillette-style blades.
Entrants, at least those with the technical wherewithal, could
choose to invade the razor market, the blade market or both.
Pricing strategies which rely on low prices for one good tied to
high prices for a second, related good are particularly at risk for
piecemeal entrance. Don’t enter the market with low prices, just
enter the market with high prices.
Gillette obviously understood all of this and had an aggressive
plan to deal with it. Patents have been very, very good for Gillette
and the obvious solution to the expiration of the foundational 1904
patents was new patents. Six months before the expiration of the
1904 patents, Gillette started running ads announcing a new
technology, a new patent and a new razor. In a large ad in The Wall
Street Journal on May 17, 1921 Gillette announced “another
triumph of American invention, the new improved Gillette safety
razor, patented January 13, 1920.” The old Gillette razor was
modestly described as the “first great advance in the Art of shaving
in 5000 years” but it was “now superseded.” The new razor
promised an increase in shaving efficiency—left unspecified
exactly—of more than 75%. The razor was offered in silver and
gold shaving sets starting at standard price of $5. Gillette hadn’t
sold the old razor for a low price and would continue to sell the
new razor at a high price.
There was also a brief note at the bottom of the ad addressing
the use of Gillette blades: “The Gillette Company assumes full
responsibility for the service of Gillette Blades when used in any
genuine Gillette Razor—either old type or New Improved Gillette.
But with imitations of the genuine it Gillette cannot take
responsibility for service of Blades.” This is interesting and, again,
as measured against the standard razors-and-blades story, a little
surprising. The note suggests that Gillette was concerned about
entry in the razor market with the fear that customers would use
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genuine Gillette blades in non-Gillette razors. If you are losing
money on razors to sell high-priced blades, this is good news. The
razor entrants would expand the installed base of customers for
Gillette blades and would do so on someone else’s dime. Gillette
should have been delighted with virtually any use of the blades,
including in competing razors. Now mixed use—one firm’s razors,
a second firm’s blades—is always a little tricky for assigning
quality. Perhaps Gillette feared that its blades would be blamed for
bad shaves using inferior razors and therefore saw the limitation as
an attempt to protect the reputation of its blades.
But the 1920 patent was just a patent on the razor and unlike
the 1904 patents it was not a patent on the underlying blades.
While Gillette was offering a new razor technology, it didn’t have
new blades. But Gillette did more—much more—than invent a
new razor. Gillette understood that with the expiration of patents
competitors could offer the old Gillette razor and presumably
would do so at lower prices. If customers still wanted to buy the
old Gillette, Gillette would sell it to them as well and now at a
much lower price. Gillette repackaged its old razor as the Brownie
and sold it at an advertised list price of $1. In its Fall 1921
catalogue—just before the expiration of the 1904 patents—Sears
offered the Brownie set—the old-style Gillette razor handle, three
blades and a case—for 85 cents. Comparable sets from Ever-Ready
and Gem sold for 88 cents. Gillette’s old razor faced the possibility
of entry and Gillette made that much less attractive by dropping
the price of the old razor to the price of the preexisting multi-blade
competition.
Take stock of how razors-and-blades is doing so far. Gillette
maintained a high price for the original Gillette razor throughout
the life of the patents. Once the 1904 patents expired, Gillette
finally dropped the price of the handle but Gillette also offered a
new handle at a very high price. Gillette was seemingly still a long
way from embracing a free-razors strategy. Gillette smartly didn’t
just hand over the market in the old Gillette model to companies
that could enter with the expiration of the 1904 patents but instead
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beat them to the punch by offering the old Gillette itself at a
competitive price.
Gillette was now pricing a product line in razors. I suspect that
Gillette assumed that most of the customers for the new Gillette
razor would be preexisting Gillette customers, that is, existing
customers who would be upgrading. If that is right, Gillette was
already selling them razor blades and wouldn’t make any more
money from additional blade sales. Instead, for those customers,
Gillette would maximize its returns from them by setting a high
price for the new razor. As to the old razor at the new price,
Gillette now looks like it was playing something more like a
“freemium” strategy rather than a classic razors-and-blades play.
As Gillette gained new customers at its now much lower price
point, Gillette had to hope that some of those customers would
eventually upgrade to the new Gillette razor.
Gillette Prices Post 1904 Patents
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Gillette launched this program six months prior to the
expiration of the 1904 patents, that is six months before entrants
could compete. On November 15, 1921—the day of the expiration
of 1904 patents—Gillette took out a large ad in the New York
Times to announce “the commercial romance of 1921.” As the ad
put it, “you may often hear it said that ‘the way this new Gillette is
going over reads like a romance.’” Really? Really? But Gillette said
it sold 1 million of the new improved razors, 600,000 in the United
States and 400,000 elsewhere. Gillette had a second shift of
production at its Gillette factory. Again at the bottom of the ad
Gillette said a word about the blades “Gillette deems it proper to
ask the public to use Gillette Blades only in genuine Gillette
Razors. The Gillette Blade and Gillette Razor are developed to
work together. No Gillette Blade can deliver its full shaving quality
unless used in a genuine Gillette Razor—built by Gillette, in the
Gillette way and up to Gillette standards.”
The 1921 Gillette Annual report laid out the numbers very
simply. In 1920, Gillette had sold 2,090,616 razor sets and
19,051,268 extra blade sets. The 1920 figures were the first recent
annual sales figures not to include extra sales to the government, as
Gillette had sold large numbers of razors and blades to the United
States military in World War I. Compared to 1920, the 1921
figures were dazzling: 4,248,069 razor sets and 19,531,861 extra
blade sets. Roughly the same number of extra blades, but more
than double the number of razor sets. The reduced prices on the
old Gillette reached “a class of purchasers who were not potential
possibilities for the NEW IMPROVED.” Those were understood
to be new Gillette customers and future blade purchasers. And the
new Gillette razor had sold remarkably well and had done so at the
standard $5 price for a razor and set of blades.
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Gillette Razor and Blade Yearly Sales
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The Brownie sales suggest that Gillette’s prior price for the
original Gillette razors had excluded large number of potential
Gillette customers. Far from giving away razors to sell blades at
high prices, Gillette had sacrificed potential razor blade sales by
selling razors at a premium price. Gillette preferred to sell highpriced razors and fewer blades to selling cheaper razors and more
blades. Gillette didn’t try to segment the razor handle market until
it was forced to do so by the threat of entry at the expiration of the
patents.
Ultimately, Gillette’s razor blade sales were tied directly to the
size of its installed base of Gillette compatible handles and the rate
of use Gillette blades. Gillette’s installed base jumped dramatically
with sales to the government during World War I and then again
with the introduction of the two-tier product strategy with the
24 Gillette appears to have stopped reporting direct handle and blades sales after

1925.

Monday, September 13, 2010 1:48 PM

Page 24

Randal C. Picker

The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s)

expiration of the 1904 patents. Razor blades sales, in turn,
presumably were driven by customer maintenance choices; Gillette
prices; and the emergence of competition in Gillette compatible
blades. Sears started selling compatible blades in 1925 and by 1929
was offering four brands of compatible blades (Fax, Radium, Rubie
and Sta-Sharp).25 Yet even if those blades took away some
customers, Gillette’s own sales jumped dramatically, as did
Gillette’s earnings.
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We have reached the end of the second stage of Gillette’s life.
The first stage is defined by the life of the 1904 patents. The
second starts six months before the expiration of those patents
when Gillette launched its new freemium razor handle approach,
selling the low-priced Brownie in competition with the other

25 More information about these blades can be found in Phillip L. Krumholz,

Collector’s Guide to American Razor Blades (1995) and Dale Justus, The Illustrated
Compendium of “Made in U.S.A.” Razor Blades (2010 ed.).
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multi-blade sellers and continuing to sell a high-end handle at its
traditional $5.00 list price backed by its new patents.
Gillette doesn’t play razors-and-blades under the 1904 patents.
It set a high-price for the handle and largely stuck to it though IT
was forced to allow some discounting around 1914. That lowered
the implicit price of the handle from roughly $4 to roughly $3, a
substantial drop, but still a relatively high price. Gillette sales—
both of handles and of blades—jumped dramatically with its new
two-product approach in 1921 and profits jumped as well. Gillette
kept blade prices firm during this transition, though it did
effectively raise prices in 1924 when it kept its list price of $1 per
packet but reduced the number of blades from 12 to 10. All of this
pushed Gillette towards something closer to a razors-and-blades
strategy though one that reflected Gillette’s two razors. Gillette
may have concluded that it would sell roughly the same number of
blades to Brownie users and new Gillette users, so it may as well
maintain a high-price for the new model to extract as much from
them as possible at that point.
What is just as interesting is the way in which being forced
into something closer to razors-and-blades seemingly benefited
Gillette and did so notwithstanding the—at least on paper—
problems with that strategy. Gillette’s ability to exploit its growing
installed base of Gillette handles should have been limited by the
emergence of a market for Gillette compatible blades. After the
expiration of the 1904 patents, other firms could make Gillettestyle blades and while that seemed to happen slowly, it did indeed
happen. Again, without a way to lock in customers, Gillette
shouldn’t have expected to charge high prices for blades and get
away with it. Yet there seems to be little doubt that after the
expiration of the 1904 patents, Gillette offered a much lowerpriced handle; sales soared and blade sales followed, even in the
face of compatible blade competition, and profits rose. This is the
second of the razors-and-blades myths, namely, that a producer
will find it almost impossible to play razors-and-blades without a
way to lock the consumable goods to the platform. Gillette no
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longer had that lock after the 1904 patents expired in 1921 and yet
the strategy it was pulled towards unwillingly worked. Whether
that was consumer habit or the superior quality of the Gillette
blades or something else is something we can’t divine from the
catalogues.26
V. Format Wars and the End of Gillette’s Pricing
Strategy (and the End of Gillette?)
Almost against its will, with the expiration of the 1904 patents,
Gillette had been dragged into a different business strategy and
one that had turned out to be quite profitable. That was the case
notwithstanding the readily-predictable emergence of Gillettecompatible blades. Life seemingly was good.
Yet by the end of 1930, Gillette was dramatically different.
Yes, this was the midst of the Depression but the changes to
Gillette were much more specific to it. Its long-standing practice
of charging $5.00 for its newest razor-and-blade set was gone and
Gillette itself had undergone a shot-gun merger with a much small
rival, Auto-Strop. When the winds of change finally stopped, King
Gillette was gone and Henry Gaisman of Auto-Strop had taken
over the joined entity.
Auto-Strop was a long-time competitor of Gillette, though
much smaller, and one with a distinctive business strategy. As sold
in the Sears catalogue, “[t]he Auto Strop razor is the only razor
that sharpens its own blades. It is a safety razor and stropping
machine combine in one.”27 Razor blade sharpeners were relatively
expensive—the well-known Twinplex for Gillette sold for $2.09 in
1927—and Auto Strop was unusual in selling a bundled product
(hence, the “auto” in the name, short for automatic stropping).
26 Harmann and Nair calculate what they label a “psychological switching cost”—a

version of habit—in the modern razors and blades market and find little evidence to
suggest that these costs are important. See Wesley R. Hartmann & Harikesh S. Nair,
Retail Competition an the Dynamics of Demand for Tied Goods, 29 Marketing Sci 366,
382 (2010).
27 1927 Sears Catalogue, p.528.
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But it wasn’t the bundle that overturned Gillette, but rather a
new patented approach to razor blades.
In a series of patents, Gaisman of Auto
Strop had focused on how the razor
blades were locked to the safety razor
itself. One of the patents clearly
attempted to interweave patent and
trademark law in the way in which it turned the trademark name
Valet into the locking mechanism for the blade.28
A second blade, the Probak, took a different approach. The
new Probak blades fit the Gillette razors—they were backwards
compatible—and fit Auto Strop’s new razor handles, but—clearly
by
design—Gillette
blades
were
incompatible with the new Auto Strop
handles. From a distance, it is a little
hard to see why this was seen as such a
great innovation in the blade business.
Gaisman had offered to sell the
invention to Gillette in 1926 but had
been turned down.29 But Autostrop
moved forward on its own to launch the
new Probak blades in 1929 and the new
“butterfly channel” blades must have had
a strong appeal. Gillette felt compelled to respond and, in early
1930, Gillette launched a new razor and a new blade.
Every aspect of that launch seems shocking. While Gillette
offered expensive deluxe models, the new razor, case and a new
blade were offered for $1. Gillette’s high-price strategy began in
1904 and continued through the life of the 1904 patents and
through the introduction of the new Gillette razor in 1921, but in
early 1930, it vanished. Moreover, Gillette introduced new blades
without having received a patent on them. As the blades

28 US Patent No 1,639,335. Issued Aug 16, 1927 (entitled “Blade Holder”).
29 See Russell Adams, King C. Gillette 147 (Little Brown, 1978).
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themselves made clear, Gillette’s patents were—to be optimistic—
pending. Gillette’s blades preserved the three-hole design of prior
Gillette razors and blades and then added a new wrinkle to attempt
to make the blades compatible only with the new Gillette razors.
The format wars were upon us.
Yet, in six months, the war was basically
over and Auto Strop had won. Auto Strop
brought a patent lawsuit in federal court in
Delaware on April 3, 1903 seeking an
injection against Gillette’s sale of the new
razors and blades. By mid-October, Gillette
announced that it was purchasing Auto
Strop to bring an end to the patent
litigation.30 But notwithstanding Gillette’s
size, contemporary observers understood that Auto Strop had the
upper hand.31 And they were right: in short order, King Gillette
was no longer president of Gillette. A new president had been
brought in and Henry Gaisman stood at the top of Gillette as chair
of its executive committee.
VI. Conclusion
The razors-and-blades story offers a foundational understanding of
a key area of economics and strategy: Invest in an installed base by
selling the razor handles at low prices or even giving them away,
then sell the razor blades at high prices to justify the prior
investment. Large chunks of modern technological life—from
VCRs and DVD players to video game systems like the Xbox and
now ebook readers—seem to operate subject to the same dynamics
of razors and blades.
At least on the paper, the competitive dynamics of this
situation are straightforward and well understood. If you actually
give away the handle to create the installed base, you need to
30 Gillette to Obtain Auto Strop Razor, The New York Times, October 16, 1930.
31 The Economist, October 11, 1930, p677.
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recapture those loses in the blade sales. And if you are selling
blades above cost, you need to be able to tie the blades to your
handle or you should expect entry in the blades business to
compete on the base that you have installed.
That is at least the theory. The actual facts of the dawn of the
disposable razor blades market are quite confounding. Gillette’s
1904 patents gave it the power to block entry into the installed
base of handles that it would create. While other firms could and
did enter the multi-blade market with their own handles and
blades, no one could produce Gillette handles or blades during the
life of the patents.
From 1904-1921, Gillette could have played razors-andblades—low-price or free handles and expensive blades—but it did
not do so. Gillette set a high price for its handle—high as
measured by the price of competing razors and the prices of other
contemporaneous goods—and fought to maintain those high
prices during the life of the patents. For whatever it is worth, the
firm understood to have invented razors-and-blades as a business
strategy did not play that strategy at the point that it was best
situated to do so.
It was at the point of the expiration of the 1904 patents that
Gillette started to play something like razors-and-blades, though
the actual facts are much more interesting than that. Before the
expiration of the 1904 patents, the multi-blade market was
segmented, with Gillette occupying the high end with razor sets
listing at $5.00 and other brands such as Ever-Ready and Gem
Junior occupying the low-end with sets listing at $1.00.
Given Gillette’s high handle prices, it had to fear entry in
handles, but it had a solution to that entry: it dropped its handle
prices to match those of its multi-blade competitors. And Gillette
simultaneously introduced a new patented razor handle sold at its
traditional high price point. Gillette was now selling a product
line, with the old-style Gillette priced to compete at the low-end
and the new Gillette occupying the high end. Gillette foreclosed
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low-end entry by doing it itself and yet it also offered an upgrade
path with the new handle.
But what of the blades? Gillette’s pricing strategy for blades
showed a remarkable stickiness, indeed, sticky doesn’t begin to
capture it. By 1909, the Gillette list price for a dozen blades was $1
and Gillette maintained that price until 1924, though there clearly
was discounting off of list as Sears sold for around 80 cents during
most of that time. In 1924, Gillette reduced the number of blades
from 12 to 10 and maintained the $1.00 list price, so a real price
jump if not a nominal one. That was Gillette’s blade pricing
strategy.
It is hard to know what to say about that strategy. If Gillette
had finally understood razors-and-blades they might have coupled
their new low-end razor with higher blade prices and the two
changes coincide roughly. But the other event, of course, was the
expiration of the 1904 blade patents and eventual entry of Gillette
blade competitors. That should have pushed blade prices down and
made it difficult for Gillette to play razors-and-blades. Indeed,
even with the drop from 12 to 10 blades, by 1930, Sears was selling
genuine Gillette blades for the price it had been selling them prior
to the packet reduction.
And all of that gets us to the final irony. No razors-and-blades
during the years of 1904 patents. With the expiration of the
patents, Gillette no longer had a way to tie the blades to the
handles and thus, at least on paper, seemed to have no good way to
play razors-and-blades. Yet with sale of razor sets to the U.S.
government during World War I and the jump in handle sales
with the introduction of the low-price old-style handle, Gillette’s
installed based jumped rapidly and the profits followed.
And that leaves a hole in the analysis. Gillette hadn’t played
razors-and-blades when it could have during the life of the 1904
patents and didn’t seem well situated to do so after their expiration,
but it was exactly at that point that Gillette played something like
razors-and-blades and that was when it made the most money.
Razors-and-blades seems to have worked at the point where the
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theory suggests that it shouldn’t have. Why is that? Did Gillette
succeed because of quality or were their powerful even-if-hard-todiscern-now locks—psychological or otherwise—between the
razors and the blades?
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